中國金融法律執行力度的空缺由名譽懲罰來彌補
THE vast gaps in the regulations governing China's financial markets are nosecret. The risks are spelled out in mind-numbing detail in every Chinese shareprospectus issued to Western investors. They run the gamut from the possibilityof full-blown Communist expropriation to bad accounting, insider trading,market manipulation and fraud.
中國金融市場監管制度的巨大漏洞早已不是什麽秘密。在呈現給西方投資者的中國股票計劃書中，所有對風險細節的描述都讓人大腦短路。這些風險從標準的***產主義式沒收的可能性開始，壹直到糟糕的會計，內部交易，市場交易和欺詐行為。
There are enough prosecutions to indicate that mischief-making goes on,but not enough to make enforcement appear credible. Even when there are rules,the line between acceptable and unacceptable conduct is often unclear, and someactions are patently unfair. There is, for example, no “full” disclosure law,no match of regulation FD in America.Companies frequently meet investors selectively. The information that emergescan include changes in senior management—and hence strategy—and be ofextraordinary value. In more developed markets, aggrieved shareholders kept inthe dark could fire off private lawsuits; but private litigation in Chinais allowed only after the state has determined malfeasance.
雖然足夠多的說明書顯示這些問題還在繼續，但法律的執行力度卻遠遠不夠。即使是有相應的條文，其在可接受和不可接受行為之間的界線也通常不清晰，而且壹些法律明顯就不公平。比方說，中國沒有和美國《反選擇性披露法》類似的要求“全部”披露的法律。公司頻繁地有選擇性地為投資者提供信息。有些信息因為涉及到公司高層的變動——從而影響公司戰略——而有很高的價值。在更加發達的市場上，那些被蒙蔽而憤懣的股東們可以發起私人訴訟；但在中國，只有政府認定了錯誤之後，私人的起訴程序才能啟動。
Given these shortcomings, Chinamight well be shunned by investors, but it is not. Its Shanghaiand Shenzhen stockmarkets—though falling sharply this year—were togethermcapitalised at $3.9 trillion at the end of January, more than in any country inthe world except America andJapan.Despite their size, the markets are not efficient, however. Share-pricemovements, according to several studies, do not fit as closely with financialresults as in other large markets. That is not only bad for investors; it alsoundermines the stockmarket's broader economic job of channelling capital towhere it can best be used.
按理說，有這樣大的缺陷，投資者應該盡量避開中國，但事實並非如此。上海和深圳的股市，盡管今年大幅下挫，但在1月底之前總***融資了3.9萬億美元，在所有的國家中僅此於美國和日本。然而，它的效率卻和它的規模不合拍。壹些研究表明，中國的股票價格波動與其他大型市場不同，和其財務狀況沒有緊密地相關性。這不僅不利於投資者，同樣從根本上損害了股市所肩負的經濟任務，即把資本引導到能發揮最佳效用的地方。
Name and shame 美名與惡名
Plenty of studies demonstrate the role of a good legal environment tofinancial markets. But Benjamin Liebman and Curtis Milhaupt, two professors at Columbia LawSchool, argue in a forthcoming paper*that, whatever the limitations of the scope and enforcement of China's laws,another form of regulation has quietly emerged. Drawing on China's traditions, the authoritiesnow also discipline wrongdoers using public criticism.
許多研究都證實了良好的法治環境在金融市場中的重要角色。但是Benjamin Liebman和Curtis Milhaupt，兩位哥倫比亞法律學校的教授，在即將發表的論文上，將論證無論中國法律的限制範圍和執行度如何，另壹種管制方式已經悄然興起。它源於壹種中國傳統，即權威機關正使用輿論批評來約束過錯方。
Financial markets are usually regulated through well enforced securitieslaws, like the ones Americaintroduced during the Depression; or through self-regulation, as in America before the Depression and in London's AlternativeInvestment Market today. For many years academics focused more on laws,believing that exchanges pursued members' interests rather than those ofinvestors. But a landmark study by Paul Mahoney, of the University of Virginia,a decade ago began to shift support towards self-regulation. Privately runmarkets have an interest in safeguarding investors, because that is the bestmeans of increasing listing and trading volumes and thus of generating morefees. When exchanges were run by the state, it was not clear whether theself-interest worked in that way.
通常，金融市場的管制是通過高效執行的證券法來實現，比如美國在大蕭條時期所展示的那樣；或者通過市場自律來實現，比如美國在大蕭條之前和在今日倫敦的可替換投資市場。許多年來，學術上把註意力更多的集中在法律上。但在10年前，來自維吉尼亞大學的Paul Mahoney的壹項裏程碑式的研究，卻把支持力量轉向了自律。當交易所由私人經營時，捍衛投資者就是它的壹項自身利益，因為這樣是最好方法以增加註冊公司和交易額，並因此獲得產生更多的收費。而當交易所由政府經營的時候，其自身利益是否能產生這樣的效果就很難確定了。
When China'stwo stock exchanges were created in 1990, the chief goal was to use private savingsto restructure state-owned firms. Investors received only minority stakes andlimited sway over corporate governance. Equally important, both exchanges wererun by bureaucrats, so there were fewer incentives to increase their value byattracting companies and punters. There was little effective competitionbetween them.
當中國的兩家股票交易所在1990年成立時，其主要的目的是利用私人存款以改建國有企業。投資者僅能得到很小的股權且對公司的運營的影響非常有限。同樣重要的是，兩家交易所均由政府機關運營，因而他們吸引公司和投機者以實現自身增殖的動機小得多。他們之間也幾乎沒有有效的競爭。
Over the past 18 years, Chinahas introduced rules against market manipulation, fraud and insider dealing,but enforcement remains patchy. The China Securities Regulatory Commissionseems competent but overwhelmed. Sometimes it takes years to issue penaltiesafter lengthy investigations—and along the way cases lose relevance.
過去的18年間，中國頒布了許多禁止市場操縱，欺詐和內部交易的法律，但執行度始終都不足。中國證監會表面上是合格的，但實際上基本是擺設。有時候它得花上幾年的調查時間才能公布處罰，隨著時間的流逝，這些案件都失去了相關性。
In the meantime, the exchanges have quietly begun to acquire authority.The power that they wield appears flimsy—the most serious penalty they can levyis a rebuke to firms and individuals through public notices. But it isremarkably effective in a country with a long history of punishment byhumiliation—think of the cangue, a rectangular slab around the neck, inpre-Communist times and dunce caps in the Cultural Revolution.
就在同壹時間，證交所已經悄悄地開始獲取威權。他們能實現的最嚴重的處罰是斥責公司和個人並引起公眾的註意，看起來是個很脆弱的權力。但對於壹個歷史上長期將羞辱當作懲罰的國家，它非常的有效——想想***產主義之前的刑枷，把脖子圍住的矩形木板和文化大革命時期的愚蠢的“高帽子”。
Messrs Liebman and Milhaupt write that between 2001 and 2006 the exchangespublicly criticised 205 companies and almost 1,700 people. They looked at theshare prices of the targeted firms both when they disclosed the conduct forwhich they were being criticised and when the criticism was published. Theadmissions typically preceded the rebukes, and in the few weeks that followedthe firms' share prices underperformed the Shanghai stockmarket by an average of up to6% (see left-hand chart). After the criticism, there was a further lag of up to3% on average (see right-hand chart).
Messrs Liebman和Milhaupt寫到，在2001和2006年之間證交所公開批評了205家公司和近1700個人。他們觀察目標公司的股票價格變化，包括它們披露其受到批評的行動的時候和針對他們的批評被發布的時候。正常情況下是公司承認在先，隨後的幾周內這家公司的股票價格平均低於上海市場近6%（見左圖）。而隨後的公***批評，在壹定的延遲下又可以讓它繼續下跌平均3%（見右圖）。
Using evidence from extensive interviews, Messrs Liebman and Milhauptpoint to other damage too. Raising money through equity markets and banksbecame more costly, and sometimes impossible, for companies that had beencriticised. Suppliers and customers also took a tougher line. Some people lost theright to be a director or senior manager, and suffered from pariah status in acountry where there is little pity for failure. The criticisms were sometimeseven a prelude to formal investigations by the regulatory authorities.
更廣泛地調查取證後，Messrs Liebman和Milhaupt指出還存在著其他的損失。因為公司被批評，它從銀行和股市融資將變得更加困難，有時候甚至無法融資。供應商和消費者也會更加決絕。有些人將失去成為總裁或高管的機會，還會在這個對失敗者沒有同情心的國家承受千夫所指的痛苦。批評有時候甚至是監管機關正式調查的前奏。
Criticism may count for a couple of reasons, the authors suggest. Amid thevacuum of information in China,any hint of bad news is likely to be seized upon. And, in a state-run economy,it is never good to be unpopular with the authorities.
作者表示，批評有如此威力是出於幾個原因。在中國，因為信息空缺，任何壹個關於壞消息的暗示都可能引起巨大的關註。而且，在政府經營的經濟體裏，得罪權威部門在任何情況下都不是好事。
From an academic point of view, more intriguing is that the exchanges havebegun to regulate themselves even though they are not private. This suggeststhat there is room, even in countries with authoritarian governments, for newforms of governance to emerge when laws fail. It is quite conceivable that theexchanges may become better regulators than the official ones.
從壹個學術的觀點來看，更加有趣的是，盡管證交所並非私人經營，但也開始約束自身。這顯示，即使在威權主義政府的國家，當法律無從施力時，同樣有空間讓新的管理方式興起。我們完全可以相信，相比起政府機關來，證交所將是更優秀的監管者。